Navigating Turbulent Waters: The Collision of Tanker A

Background of the Incident

On an otherwise calm morning in a traffic separation scheme (TSS), an incident unfolded that would draw attention to critical issues in maritime safety and navigation practices. Tanker A was on its vessel pathway under the watchful eye of the Master and the Officer of the Watch (OOW). The weather conditions were favorable, with visibility extending to approximately 10 to 12 nautical miles, providing an ideal scenario for safe navigation.

The Watch Transfer

At around 0224 hours, the Master, confident in the OOW’s abilities, handed over the con and navigational responsibilities while remaining on the bridge. This OOW had only joined the tanker a day earlier, unfamiliar with both the vessel and its operational procedures. By 0430, the Master, feeling assured of the OOW’s readiness, left the bridge, allowing him to navigate the vessel on his own for the first time.

The Oncoming Traffic

As Tanker A moved through a high-density traffic route, it approached a waypoint requiring a substantial port course alteration of about 50 degrees. Delaying this maneuver to allow a reciprocal ship to pass, the OOW shifted to manual steering upon clearance. It was at this juncture that attention to navigating duties countered with administrative tasks—one of the first signs of impending trouble.

At approximately 0530, the OOW, while observing multiple radar targets, visually identified a nearby vessel lacking navigation lights. Despite the deck lights being on, the absence of navigation signals can often indicate significant hazards, but the OOW chose to maintain a course of 018°. This critical decision stemmed from a misunderstanding of risk management in busy waterways.

The Deteriorating Situation

By around 0545, while engrossed with administrative work in the chartroom, the OOW learned through radar that the vessel directly ahead, now identified as Target 46, was closing in with a CPA (Closest Point of Approach) of just 0.18 nautical miles. Despite this alarming data, the OOW reassured the lookout that course adjustments would be made to facilitate the ongoing passage of the vessels ahead.

Returning to the wheelhouse by 0551, the OOW realized the looming danger: Target 46 was now within a mere 2.9 nautical miles, with a projected CPA nearing zero. Only a minor course adjustment to starboard was undertaken, but within moments, another target — Target 53 — had been spotted, further complicating matters.

The Collision

At 0558, the situation escalated. The lookout urgently beckoned the OOW back to the bridge, where a large anchored ship was now too close for comfort — less than a cable ahead. The OOW reacted by switching to manual steering and applying hard starboard rudder. But Tanker A was still moving at a speed of 14 knots, making the collision unavoidable.

By approximately 0602 hours, Tanker A collided with Target 46 as its bow contacted the port anchor chain. Consequently, the entangled anchor chain drew both vessels closer together, leading to severe hull breaches and the outbreak of fire on both ships. The chaos that ensued was both immediate and catastrophic.

Immediate Aftermath

In the chaos of flames, destruction, and confusion, the Master of Tanker A returned to the bridge to a scene reminiscent of a disaster movie. A MayDay distress call was broadcast, calling for immediate assistance as fire engulfed the port side of the accommodation. With flames quickly spreading, an abandon ship order was initiated, leading to a tense evacuation process. Despite initial challenges due to smoke and fire on the sea, all 22 crew members from Tanker A were ultimately rescued.

Meanwhile, Target 46 was left adrift, with its crew battling fires onboard. Although they were eventually rescued, a tragic loss occurred when a shore worker aboard did not survive.

Investigation Insights

Upon investigation, several critical issues came to surface. It was revealed that the OOW had only managed about two hours of rest in the 38.5-hour timeframe before the incident. Fatigue likely played a significant role in his compromised performance and decision-making skills. Furthermore, the anchored vessel had attempted to alert Tanker A using an ALDIS lamp and sound signals, which unfortunately proved ineffective.

Most notably, this incident highlighted a glaring gap in communication protocols. VHF radios were not utilized to clarify the developing situation, introducing unnecessary risk at a crucial moment.

Lessons Learned

1. Collision Liability: The maritime industry typically sees shared responsibility for collisions between vessels. However, colliding with an anchored ship often results in a disproportionately higher liability on the moving vessel.

2. Workload Management: The OOW’s decision to prioritize administrative responsibilities over navigation was questionable. Is enough staffing available for the increasing workload in modern maritime operations?

3. Focus on Navigation: Balancing multiple duties during a navigational watch can lead to catastrophic outcomes. Maintaining a singular focus on navigation is crucial.

4. Fatigue Awareness: The minimal rest prior to the watch likely contributed to impaired judgment. Travel time should contribute to cumulative work/rest calculations to avoid fatigue.

5. Safety Protocols: Given the International Safety Management (ISM) Code’s advocacy for risk management, companies should invest in ensuring crews are adequately rested and can navigate safely without fatigue impairing their judgment.

As the marine industry continues to advance, understanding the dynamics that contribute to such tragic incidents will be vital in preventing similar occurrences in the future.